The Trusted Computer Security Eva.lua.tion Crit.eria has become a defacto standxd for securit(y features in trusted systems. Unfort,mna,tely, the TCSEC was formulated at a time when computing was done in centralized facilities wit.11 low level a.ccess (i.e. opera.ting system access) to the computer.
1
Problem Statement
The concept.ual foundation of the TCSIX lies in the mid t,o 1a.t.e 19iO's. The st,yle of comput.ing t.hen wa.s t,ypically a. Inainframe compo kr wit.11 many t,ermina.1 coiiiiect.ioiis.
Specia.lized support personnel would a.ct,ually 0pera.t.e t.he comput,er and run jobs. Today, users have a cpu sitt.ing on their desk (in some t.ype of enclosure wit,11 thr necessary ancilkes).
They use a.pplications which are loaded dir&ly ont,o t,heir local cpu and then run. These t,wo views must be reconciled.
The emphasis was on t.he operat.ing syst.em aud syst.ems level programs.
Even casual coml>utcY users hacl t.0 have a fairly good uiidcrst~anding of t,lie opt>ra.ting svst,em. In adtlit.ion, t,here were 1101. many commercially ava.ilable utilities or even applicatiol1 programs. In this environment.
t.he users required low level access to t,he system t,o perform t,heir job. If a. cert.ain utility 1la.d not been writt.en by someone elst' t.hen t,he user required the t,ools t,o writ,e his/her own. These tools were compilers, assemblers, and command langua.ges (such a. \&IS CObI Jobs or Uz\;IX Script.s). The comput.er secl1rit.y problem was magnified. since the low level access required low level securit,y prot,tzct.ions. These low Icvcl 1.001s even aggrava.t.c>tl compllt.el seci1rit.y coIlcer1Is such as convert. cllani& sinccs 1.k tools provided access t,o such a varicaty of syst.cm resources t.1ia.t. the number of possible covrrt. channels was greatly iucreasrd.
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In the current view, a user has a box on her desk. She haa a variety of software applications that she uses to do her job. In many cases such users neither desire access to, nor care to have access to low level system primitives. Any necessary access to low level operations is done for the user by the application.
Such application-oriented operations conflicts with the TCSEC. The TCSEC treats the system in its entirety. Everything from the user interface to the lowest level of instruction must be considered when evaluating/certifying a system. Traditionally, it has been felt that focusing the protections at the lowest level possible will make it easier to understand the protections. For a monolithic system that is completely specified at its inception, this belief is t,rue. The problem a.rises when you desire to use a different a.pplica.tion. Since most applications perform low level opera.tion.9 for t,lie user, they run afoul of the low level protections unless they or the system were designed for tha.t operat.ion. Consequently, it is difficult if not impossible to build a TCSEC style trusted system that allows simple execution of applications. This is not a fa.iling of the TCSEC. It. is simply a problem tha.t a.rises beca.use we use comput,ers differently now. The question should be whet.her only low level protections a.re necessa.ry in the new st,yle of computer use. The problem is aggravated since most, applications are written with disregard for securit.y. Granted some applications ha.ve simple password protections, but in general the only security provided in any measure is meant to protect against unauthorized duplication.
Some researchers are beginning to understand that the security prot,ections ca.n be loca.ted in other parts of the system, such a.s in the a,pplication [G] . This understanding st,ems from the new st,yle of computer opera.tion.
Unfort.unat,ely, such securit,y distribution is at odds wibh t.he TCSEC.
A Solution
Ideally, a new view of computer securit,y should exploit the new style of comput.ing.
This new style in some cases helps, for example covert channels would be less of a threat since fewer syst.em resources would be accessible. In other ca.ses the new style introduces new problems, for example composing the a.pplicat.ion security features with the operat.ing syst,em (and possible different opera.ting syst.ems). Defining this composition will be a. major problem in a.chieving any sensible assurance.
The application view of a. computer has several a. Not. all of t,he prot.cct.ion would resitlc in t.he a.pplicat.ion.
The operat,ing syst,em would be responsible for some of t,lie prot.ect.ions. Ideally, a subset of the security fea.tures would be ident.ified and t,lie operating syst.em would provide t.liose feat.ures a.cross all a.pplica.tions.
The applica.tions would be responsible for t.he rema.inder if t,liey were applicable to t.he t.ype of application.
In t,his view of securit.y the informat.ion displayed for t.he user is import.ant., which leads to t.he user int,erfa.ce. Much of what. t,lie riser sets's is a funct.ion of the user int,erface, and not. (he individual applica.tion. This is part.icularly t,rue of graphical user int.erfaces (GIJIs). A GUI is a screen display where t.he physica. display is divided into windows, familiar examples being the X-window system, and RIicrosoft.'s Windows. Not only a.re inclividua.1 processes and a.pplicat.ions displayed as separa.te windows, but much of t,he user int,erface is displayed gra.phically, such as but,tons and bars for window commands, and icons for files or applicat,ions.
Afucl~ of the securit,y feat.rires discliss4 in t.liis paper are also relevant. t,o non-graphical useI iiit.erfa.ces (i.e. command line iiiterpret,ers.
and evc:ii ascii-ba.sed menus). The problem is (.hat. Girls are in such demand t.hat it. is bet.t.er t,o focus t.he discussion on their fea.tures, bearing in mind l.liat. t,lir solrit.ion does not require a GTJI.
The problem with GUIs is the number of levels of software between the user and the'kernel.
The abstract layers of software are: application, window, window manager, system software, operating system, and kernel. Not all GUIs have these layers, and some might even have more. With this number of layers it is little wonder that assurance of such a system is suspect. Some method is required to reduce the complexity.
Objedt orientation offers some hope of reducing the problem. Object orientation in general promises to deliver many of the advantages of soft.ware engineering. In particular object orientation offers encapsulation, inheritance, and abstraction. A truly integrated object oriented GUI (OOGUI) might offer even more advantages.
Currently, the only OOGUI commercially ava.ilable is the NeXTstep environment [lo] , so I will use it a.s au example. The interfa.ce is structured in a.n Object.ive-C (the object oriented language used for implement.ation, a mix of Smalltalk and C) cla.ss hierarchy. All classes are subclasses of the Object class which allows all objects to share certa.in attribut,es. This sharing is the inheritance. Any class tl1a.t is defined lower in the hierarchy than an arbitrary class inherit,s all of the functions and data structures of that class. Those subclasses are then free to modify or overwrite the inherited functions and data stru&ures.
NeXTstep minimizes the GUI complexity issue by eliminating several of the la.yers. For NeXTst,ep t,he layers are: application, NeXTstep, Mach kernel. For compatibility the "tra.dit.iona.l" Unix syst.em ca.lls a.re implement,ed as calls to the kernel, hut. they are not used by the NeXTstep environment,. All code in a NeXTstep application is pa.rt of the cla.ss hierarchy, therefore every function must ha.ve a. pla.ce in the hierarchy. Either a function will be located in a default location or it will be inserted into t,he hierarchy by the programmer, possibly inheriting ot,her functions from superclasses.
The inheritance can help the securit,y issues. The security functions can be collect,ed into separate classes, preferably grouped by some functiona. classification, i.e. access control object, audit,ing object, etc. In addition, the methods (messa,ges) in these cla.sses could not be overwritten.
Then a.11 subclasses would inherit the security properties for the a.ppropriate activities. All interaction with the services provided by the operating system would also a.ut.oma.t,ica.lly get the security functions.
With security objects there would be three levels of security abstractions; operat.ing syst,em level prot,ections, OOGUI level protect,ions, and applicat,ion level abstractions.
When implemented these security abstractions would actually reside in the security objects. The purpose of these objects would then be three-fold: to keep the applicat,ions from directly a.ccessing system level resources, provide all security functions for the GUI, and to provide a foundation for applica.tion developers to include securit.y in t.heir applicat,ions.
Future Directions
This t.ype of application level securit,y is essentially a new paradigm in computer security. The immediate obstacle is the view influenced by existing security guidelines. This new view is proposed with as little bia.s as possible (towards a.ny securit,y policy). This presenta.tion does not. mean t,hat. it cannot, support. a DOD st.yle hirrarchy, rat.her t.his t.his pa.radigm supports a much broader range of opt.ions. Regarding t.he TCSEC, the main difficu1t.y would be t.he lack of a single coherent. trust.ed comput,ing base. Again, the TC-SEC view of t.he world is monolit.hic opera.t.ing syst,ems while some iut.erpretations of the TCSEC [8,9] a.dclress distribut,ecl resources, they st,ill rely on t,he concept of a single TCB. As distributed security is bet,ter understood, t,he security object will become more fea.sible. In particular, t.he security object. appears well suit.ed to a, client, server t,ype archit.ect%urr. The Trust.ed Mach project. is t,lie only syst,eni currently undergoing evalua.tiou t,hat. support.s anyt,hiug close to this st.ylc of TC'B [5]. T-Mach at. 1 cast. provides a. 111otlrl 1.0 work \vit,h, and it would IMP iust.ruct.ive t.o snap t,he requiren1ent.s of security object.s to the services of T-Mach.
A relat,ed quest.ion is t.he OOGITI it,self. Currently, NeXTstep is t,he only OOGUI available, alt,hough other vendors are working on similar 1)roduct.s. ACcessing a. distribut~ed TCB's services would require estensious to t.he OOGUI. The problem a.rises because of a difference in philosophy. The met.hotls of t.he securit,y object,s could not. be overwrit,ten. which is count,er t.0 the idea of iuherit.ance. It, might. even require a niodification to the underlying syst,en~ since normally t.he methods can be overwrit,ten in subclasses. The: issue is more t.1ia.n simply rest,rict,ing t.lie methods. but. in the semantics of the methods. For example, since the security met.hods cannot be overwrit t,en what, should be t,he desired behavior if a securit,y met,hods wa.s overwrit,ten by a subcla.ss? An a.clclit.ional fact.or is t.1ia.t much of the bfalia.vior of t,liis OOGITI is only det,ermined at runtime.
It. is possil>lf> that. t.he behavior might, not be tlrt.ect.ed during compilation.
A similar problem es& with ll~e scxcurity consitlerat.ious. The securily fuuct ions a~'(' llot provided 1)~ a monolithic TCB. The functionality is provided by several different abstractions. There is a major problem with analyzing the overall securit,y of such a system. At the higher levels of assurance, a formal model is required. If the security functions cannot be sufficiently described the only recourse might be to model the entire system! This solution is obviously unsa.tisfactory. A better solution would be to provide a method for composing the security functions when they are provided by different parts of the system. This question is even more important since most current approaches to formal security models rely on first order logic, which is not suitable for extensible domains. As we better understand composible security functions, we can begin to understand assurance of security objects.
Conclusion
We no longer use computers as we did when the TC-SEC was developed. This is a sepamte issue from the complaint about the TCSEC's focus on the DOD hierarchical security policy. Most users do not have and do not want system level a.ccess to t,he computer resources. They need to start a.pplica.tions a.nd get work done. We must move some prot,ections from the operating system to the applica.tions. A trust,ed operating system could provide protections for t,hese new applications, but it would be more difficult. It would be easier to place the protections in t,lie a.pplication, since the application can protect those resources it knows it uses.
The problem then is to provide an environment, tl1a.t simplifies developing these a.pplications.
An object oriented graphical user int,erface provides one possible solution. Incorpora.ting security objects into the inheritance hierarchy the security prot,ect,ions would automatically be availa.ble t,o a.pplicat.ion code. These security objects would also provide t.he int,erfa.ce to t.he operating system level protections.
Such a radical change in trusted systems has its difficulties. Not all the necessary tools are in place. Work is required on composing security features across different parts of the system, understanding dist.ribut,ed TCBs, and the effects of theses cha.nges on the OOGUI. Such radical change also has promise. Security would not be as onerous as it is now. Security features across applications would be more consistent.. The most important adva.ntage would be t1la.t such security classes would be a major advance towa.rds providing "plug and play" security in a distribut,ed architecture.
